

Quarterly Report Ending April 30 1968

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCDH

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
(RCS CSFOR - 65) (BC)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: Vicinity CU CHI, CU CHI Base Camp (XT647153), RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General F.K. Mearns
Prepared by: Major Richard A Baun, Commanding Officer, 18th MR Det

I. (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. Operations

1. General: The "Tropic Lightning Division" continued its 1968-68 Dry Season Campaign during the course of this reporting period. The mission of the Division in the Dry Season Campaign is specified in 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 17-67 (1967-68 DRY SEASON CAMPAIGN PLAN-DRYSECAP). The mission is to conduct military operations in the Divisional Tactical Area of Operational Interest (TAOI), to assist Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces in military pacification of LONG AN, HAU NGHIA and BINH DUONG Provinces, to secure allied base areas and to control resources, particularly food, and to neutralize War Zone "C". The Dry Season Campaign had commenced 1 November 1967 and progressed through Phase I and Phase II prior to the beginning of this reporting period. Phase III commenced 1 February 1968.

Within the context of the Dry Season Campaign, the 25th Infantry Division participated in five major operations (battalion size or larger) and 530 small unit actions during the period 1 February to 30 April 1968. The major operations were Operations YELLOWSTONE, SARATOGA, QUYET THANG, WILDERNESS and TOAN THANG. All major operations and 49 of the small unit actions resulted in enemy contact. Elements of the 25th Infantry Division were in contact with the enemy on each day of this reporting period.

Phase III of the Dry Season Campaign and division operations for the reporting period were significantly bracketed and dominated by the reaction to the NVA/VC TET Offensive which commenced 30 - 31 January and the response to the suspected second NVA/VC Offensive expected on or about 1 May 1968. In general, operations during this time frame were characterized by counter offensive activities in response to the enemy TET Offensive between the period 1 February - 10 March, coordinated US/GVN search and destroy activities during the period 11 March - 22 April, and after 22 April, deployment of divisional forces and combat operations designed to counter an expected enemy attack on the Saigon area on or about 1 May 1968.

2. Operation YELLOWSTONE (8 December - 24 February 1968).

This operation, as previously discussed in the 25th Infantry Division Operational Report for the period 1 November to 31 January 1968, was directed at neutralizing War Zone "C" in the northern portion of the Divisional TAOI. It commenced concurrently with Operation SARATOGA which in turn was primarily directed at pacification activities in the southern portion of the TAOI. Initially,

YELLOWSTONE was a two brigade operation involving the Division's 1st and 3rd Brigades. The basic mission of YELLOWSTONE as specified by 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 18-67 was to neutralize War Zone "C" in the northern part of TAY NINH Province by destroying NVA/VC forces and installations in the area and completing several engineering projects of rebuilding or constructing road networks, US Special Forces (USSF)/Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps and KATUM (XT3389) airfield.

As of 1 February, the 1st and 3rd Brigades were committed in force with supporting engineer and cavalry units to YELLOWSTONE. However, the initiation of the enemy buildup in the southern portion of the TAOI in mid January forced the gradual re-deployment of the 1st and 3rd Brigade assets to the south. The commencement of the TET Offensive on 30 - 31 January 1968 accelerated the re-deployment as assets were moved to support Operation SARATOGA and/or detached to the Capital Military District (CMD) for the defense of Saigon, Tan Son Nhut, etc.

The 1st Brigade was committed to YELLOWSTONE from 1 February until its termination on 24 February. However, whereas the 1st Brigade operated on 1 February with four maneuver battalions, on 24 February it terminated operations with one maneuver battalion. The 1st Brigade also commenced participation in Operation SARATOGA on 17 February and was committed to both operations concurrently until 24 February.

The 3rd Brigade terminated its activities in YELLOWSTONE on 16 February after being committed to YELLOWSTONE and SARATOGA concurrently on 6 February. The 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry which had supported the two brigades throughout the earlier phases of YELLOWSTONE was withdrawn from the Operation on 2 February, but provided limited aerial reconnaissance on 4, 8 and 15 February.

Details of significant activities within YELLOWSTONE for the period of this report are contained in the Combat Operations After Action Reports attached to this report as TAB B.

The final results of Operation YELLOWSTONE were:
US losses: 137 KIA, 1085 WIA (586 evacuated); 14 APC's, 210-1A's, 61 helicopters; 22 trucks, 4 tanks, 1 M55 Quad 50, 3 howitzers, 2 AVLB's, 1 Rome Plow, 1 crane, 1 earth mover and 3 trailers damaged; 5 trucks, 2 tanks, 12 APC's, 1 M42 duster, 1 trailer, 1 search light, ¼ ton and 7 helicopters destroyed.

Enemy losses: 1170 KIA, 182 detainees, 144 individual weapons, 69 crew-served weapons, 36 pounds of documents, 42765 rounds of small arms ammunition, 14 120mm mortar rounds, 4 flare pistols, 179.8 tons of rice, 7 radios, 200 pounds of medical supplies, 2 hand grenades and 12 telephones captured; 15686 grenades, 293 mines, 43 cluster bomb units, 42 bombs, 562 artillery and mortar rounds, 16515 small arms rounds, 384.3 tons of rice, 1 truck and 3 telephones destroyed.

A total of 1201 tactical Air Force sorties were flown in support of YELLOWSTONE.

3. Operation SARATOGA (8 December 1967 to 10 March 1968).

This operation, as previously discussed in the 25th Infantry Division Operational Report for the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968, was directed at the southern portion of the division TAOI, and was executed concurrently with YELLOWSTONE in its earlier phases. The mission of SARATOGA as specified by 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 1967, was to conduct operations in conjunction with RVN forces, to pacify portions of LONG AN, BINH DUONG and HAU NGHIA Provinces within the TAOI, to secure allied base areas, to control resources, particularly food, and to prevent enemy rice taxation.

The initial concept of execution for SARATOGA envisioned the 2nd Brigade maneuvering with three battalions and supporting forces in conducting combined operations with the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions, and other GVN forces in the three province area. The concept of execution was to take place in two phases. Phase I (1 December - 31 January 68) corresponded with the last two months of the rice harvest. (1 February to 31 February '68) could see a continuation of operations with the emphasis placed on transferring responsibility for TAOI pacification to the ARVN and other OAN forces.

The execution of SARATOGA underwent significant changes in the last half of January with the gradual buildup of NVA/VC forces in the three province area preparatory to the TET Offensive. The operation took on an entirely different aspect with the launching of the enemy's TET Offensive on 30-31 January 1968. Divisional assets committed to YELLOWSTONE were re-deployed to support SARATOGA. The 3rd Brigade commenced activities in SARATOGA on 6 February, dividing its assets between YEKLOWSTON and SARATOGA. On 16 February, the 3rd Brigade terminated its involvement in YELLOWSTONE to devote all its attention to SARATOGA. On 17 February the 1st Brigade joined SARATOGA, and on 24 February with the termination of YELLOWSTONE, was committed in its entirety to SARATOGA. With the exception of divisional elements detached to the Capital Military District (CMD) all divisional elements participated in SARATOGA until its termination 10 March.

The emphasis in Operation SARATOGA between 1 February and 10 March was placed on counter attacking against NVA/VC forces which had moved in force into built up and populated centers in HAU NGHIA, BINH DUONG, LONG and GIA DINH Provinces, to defending allied base camps which had come under heavy attack, and on mounting a counter offensive to destroy NVA/VC forces and installations in the northern portion of the TAOI. Concurrently with this phase of SARATOGA, divisional elements were sent into the Capital Military District to assist with the defense of Saigon, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, etc., and to clear enemy forces out of the CMD.

Details ;of the significant organizational operations of SARATOGA are included in Combat Operations After Action Reports attached to this report as TAB C.

The final results of Operation SARATOGA were:

US losses: 374 KIA, 1855 WIA (1184 evacuated); 2 MIA, 2'0-1's, 50 helicopters, 5 dozers, 18 Rome Plows, 1 FADAC, 15 tanks, 27 trucks, 31 APC's and 1 radio damaged; 1 asphalt distributor, 1 tractor, 2 tanks, 1 - 90mm RR, 46 APC's, 5 trucks and 1 helicopter destroyed.

Enemy losses: 3836 KIA, 581 detainees, 406 individual weapons, 180 crew-served weapons, 361 pounds of documents, 18 radios, 8.8 tons of rice, 40850 small arms rounds, 271 RPG-2 rounds, 600 pounds of medical supplies, and 5 telephones captured, 3 radios, 2533 grenades, 1715 rockets, artillery and mortar rounds, 98 mines, 66147 small arms rounds, 87 cluster bomb units, 24 individual weapons, 113 crew-served weapons, and 17 bombs destroyed.

1432 tactical air sorties were flown in support of SARATOGA.

4. Operation QUYET THANG (11 March - 7 April 1968) The mission of the 25th Infantry Division in Operation QUYET THANG was to conduct combined operations with GVN forces to destroy NVA/VC forces within the Capital Military District, HAU NGHIA and BINH DUONG Provinces, and to maintain the capability to reinforce Tan Son Nhut air base with mechanized or armored forces.

Operation QUYET THANG was a combined II Field Force and II and III RVN Corps operation designed to clear enemy forces from Saigon and its environs, and to restore RVN control of the area in the wake of the enemy TET Offensive.

In addition to the involvement of the 25th Infantry Division in this operation, the US 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions also participated in conjunction with the ARVN 5th and 25th Infantry Divisions, the RVN Airborne Division and RVN Marine Task Force.

The "Tropic Lightning" Division began Operation QUYET THANG on 11 March with two brigades, the 2nd and 3rd, and one task force, TF 4-23 (Mech), committed. TF 4-23 (Mech) operated concurrently between QUYET THANG and Operation WILDERNESS which also commenced 11 March. For both operations the task force had the mission of road security of the MSR between CU CHI, TAY NINH and DAU TIENG.

(P5)

The task organization of 2nd Brigade, 3rd Brigade, and TF 4-23 (Mech) remained the same for Operation QUYET THANG until the operation was terminated on 7 April. A detailed description of significant organizational operations on QUET THANG is included in Combat After Action Reports attached to this report as TAB-D.

The final results of Operation QUET THANG are as follows:

US losses: 50 KIA, 396 WIA (289 evac.), 9 tanks, 18 APC's, 7 trucks and 4 Rome Plows damaged. 1 helicopter, 9 APC's and 2 trucks destroyed.

Enemy losses: 729 KIA, 96 detained and 36 PW's, 234 individual weapons, 37 crew-served weapons, 62.6 tons of rice, 273 pounds of documents, 5 radios, 5.2 tons of salt, 21018 small arms rounds, 54 rocket rounds, and 1 Russian aiming circle captured: 1471 rocket, mortar or artillery rounds, 10.2 tons of rice, 1933 hand grenades, 19413 small arms rounds, 3.5 tons of salt, 230 mines, 69 sampans, 3 bombs, 749 rounds of documents, 5 crew served weapons, 105 cluster bombs, 1 truck, 1 radio, 16 individual weapons and 300 crates of ammunition destroyed.

A total of 312 tactical Air Force sorties were flown in support of Operation QUET THANG.

5. Operation WILDERNESS (11 March - 7 April 1968). The mission of the 25th Infantry Division in Operation WILDERNESS was to continue the mission activities associated with Operation YELLOWSTONE. The operations plan for WILDERNESS envisioned the security of allied base camp areas in the northern portion of the division TAOI with emphasis on the protection of TAY NINH base camp, TAY NINH city, DAU TIENG base camp, DAU TIENG city, BAU CO and the artillery fire support base, ST. BARBARA near BAU CO. The plan also envisioned security of the MSR's connecting these military and civilian complexes. The division commenced WILDERNESS on 11 March with the 1st Brigade committed with three maneuver battalions and supporting combat support elements. Task Force 4-23 (Mech) also participated in WILDERNESS in conjunction with its participation in QUYET THANG. A detailed description of the significant operations in WILDERNESS is provided by the Combat Operations After Action Reports for Operation WILDERNESS contained in TAB E to this report.

The 199th Light Infantry Brigade, an independent II Field Force Brigade with two organic battalions, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry and 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division on 31 March and participated in WILDERNESS until its completion. In addition to its two organic battalions, the 199th Brigade had operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry and A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry. (25th Infantry Division units).

The final results of Operation WILDERNESS are as follows:

US losses: 26 KIA, 155 WIA (103 evac), 4 APC's, 4 helicopters, 18 trucks, 4 trailers and 1 duster damaged: 4 APC's and 2 trucks destroyed.

Enemy losses: 274 KIA, 4 PW's, 61 detainees, 150 rounds of small arms ammunition, 5 individual weapons, 1 crew-served weapon, 9.2 tons of rice, 27 pounds of documents and 1 motorcycle captured. 5 tons of rice, 20 mines, 37 sampans, 1 cluster bomb, 90 grenades, 1150 rounds of small arms ammunition and 18 rocket, mortar or artillery rounds destroyed.

A total of 289 tactical Air Force sorties were flown in support of WILDERNESS.

6. Operation TOAN THANG (COMPLETE VICTORY) (7 April 1968 - continuing). On 7 April 1968, the 25th Infantry Division commenced participation in Operation TOAN THANG. 25th Infantry Division Operations Order 1-68 (TAB F) established the mission of the division as follows:

a. Within assigned operational area of CMD, complete destruction of enemy battalions and company sized units, prevent infiltration of major forces from the western zone and support 2nd ARVN ABN TT as required.

(p6)

b. Conduct combined offensive operations in conjunction with 25th and 5th ARVN Infantry Divisions throughout TAOI to destroy enemy forces with priority to elements of 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions.

The concept of operations for all elements of the division, intelligence information, etc., are contained in the copy of the operations order appended as TAB F.

The 1st Brigade began TOAN THANG on 7 April 1968 with two maneuver battalions (4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry). The 2nd Brigade commenced the operation with four maneuver battalions: (1st Battalion, 27th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry; 1st Battalion 5th Infantry (Mech); and 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry). The 3rd Brigade operated with four battalions (2nd Battalion 22nd Infantry (Mech); 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech); 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor; and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry). The 199th Light Infantry Brigade continued under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division beginning activities in TOAN THANG with three maneuver battalions: (3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion 12th Infantry).

On 7 April the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a reconnaissance in force (RIF) from XT1829 to XT175293. At 1105 hours at the vicinity of XT178295, Company C received small arms, automatic weapon and RPC fire. The company returned fire with organic weapons and called in artillery and helicopter gunships. Nine enemy bodies were discovered following the action together with one AK-47 rifle and one carbine. The company received three wounded who were evacuated. At 1305, Company C located and destroyed 21,200 pounds of rice at XT175293.

On 8 April the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) became OPCON to the 1st Brigade from 3rd Brigade. In the 2nd Brigade area, the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry conducted a cordon and search in the vicinity XT745072 and conducted a combat assault at XT787138. At 1345 hours in the vicinity XT792115 to 792118 Companies A and D captured 246 rounds of RPG-2 ammunition, 14 RPG-47 rounds, 305 60mm mortar rounds, 258 RPG boosters, 19 75mm RR rounds, 28,800 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1100 hand grenades and 1200 82mm mortar fuses. Also on 8 April, the battalion captured two pounds of documents, one AK-47 rifle and destroyed 500 pounds of sugar, 3690 pounds of rice and four sampans. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry conducted a RIF from XT1729 to 179323. At 1445 hours at XT178296, companies A and D captured 32 Chi Com Carbines, one light machine gun, one Chi Com heavy machine gun and 25 pounds of documents. It also destroyed 15 bangalore torpedoes, one RPG-7 round, 8 claymores, 15 pounds of explosives, 1000 small arms rounds, one light anti-tank weapon (LAW) and 50 pounds of salt.

On 9 April, the 199 Light Infantry Brigade was released from OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and returned to the control of II Field Force.

On 10 April, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor passed to the operational control of the 1st Brigade from 3rd Brigade, and 3/22 Infantry passed from 1st Brigade to the 3rd Brigade. At 0950 vicinity XS725859 helicopter gunships from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion supporting 2/27 Infantry engaged 11 VC in 5 sampans with automatic weapons fire. The 5 sampans were sunk and three enemy KIA were identified by body count.

On 11 April, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry became OPCON to the 3rd Brigade from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

On 12 April the night locations of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (3rd Brigade) at XT449609 came under heavy attack at approximately 0400. The attack began with a heavy 82mm bombardment and was followed shortly by human assault waves from a battalion size enemy force. The heaviest attacks came on the battalion perimeters south and southwest where the enemy succeeded in penetrating the perimeter. Engaging the enemy in close combat until 0600 hours with small arms and automatic weapons and supported by helicopter gunships, artillery and Air Force air strikes. The 3/22nd was successful in ejecting the enemy from its night position and reestablishing its perimeter. At approximately 0615, the 3/22nd was reinforced by the 2nd Battalion 22nd Infantry (Mech) and the enemy broke contact. Results of the (p7) engagement were: 153 enemy killed; 45 AK-50 rifles, 7 AK-47 rifles, 18 machine guns, 7 RPG-2 rocket launchers, and 2 bolt action carbines with grenade launchers captured: 38 RPG-2 rounds, 5 RPG-7 rounds, 45 RPG-2 boosters and 93 hand grenades destroyed. The 3/22 suffered 16 KIA and 47 WIA in the action.

On 13 April, the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech) (3rd Brigade) was conducting a reconnaissance in force in the vicinity XT455597 when companies A and C received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG-fire at 0937. Fire was returned with organic weapons and supporting helicopter gunships and artillery. Results of the engagement were : 36 enemy KIA by body count, 6 US KIA and 46 US wounded and evacuated.

At 0615 on 14 April at vicinity XT512249, Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (1st Brigade) engaged an unknown number of VC with small arms, automatic weapons and supporting artillery and helicopter gunships. Results of the engagement were one US KIA, five VC KIA. At 0915, a helicopter gunship supporting Company C engaged an unknown number of VC at XT517242 with automatic weapons and rockets, killing eight enemy by body count. Contact between elements of the Tropic Lightning Division and enemy forces was relatively light and scattered from 15 to 22 April as the enemy avoided contact with maneuvering divisional battalions.

Reliable intelligence sources provided indications that NVA/VC main force units would attempt a major attack on Saigon and its environs on or about 1 May (Vietnamese Labor Day). To meet this threat, the 25th Infantry Division executed a major deployment of its assets on 23 April. All but two of its maneuver battalions were moved into the southern and southeastern portions of the TAOI to block the main avenues of approach into Saigon from the west. The 2nd Brigade (1/27 Infantry, 2/27 Infantry, 1/5 Infantry, 3/22 Infantry, 2/34 Armor and 3/17 Cavalry) maneuvered in GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, LONG AN and HAU NGHIA Provinces within the Division TAOI. The 3rd Brigade (2/22 Infantry (Mech) and 2/12 Infantry) assumed responsibility for the defense of TAY NINH and DAU TIENG base camp areas and the MSR's connecting them to CU CHI. The 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry (Mech) was placed directly under division control..

Contact remained light and scattered until 25 April when Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, while conducting armed aerial reconnaissance, observed a base camp area at XT485042 at 1300 hours. The target was engaged with five Air Force air strikes between 1344 and 1622 resulting in 27 VC KIA (BC).

On 26 April between 0830 and 1920, five B-52 strikes were delivered in the HO BO WOODS area. Immediately after the last strike, three companies of 2/14 Infantry conducted combat assaults into the area. Bomb damage assessment of the strikes revealed 17 VC KIA (BC), 14 sampans, a large number of bunkers and trenches and a 500 caliber machine gun destroyed.

At approximately 1530, 27 April at XT517943, B Troop, 3/17 Air Cavalry observed a large number of VC in the open. Initial engagement by helicopter gunships resulted in 4 VC KIA (BC). Air Force air strikes were called into the area as well as additional gunships from the 344th Assault Helicopter Battalion and B Troop, 3/17 Cavalry between 1600 and 1700 hours. An additional 35 VC KIA (BC) was gained in the follow up strikes.

On 28 April at approximately 1030 at XT549119, the 49th ARVN Regiment came into contact with an estimated enemy company. The 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) was conducting a RIF in the vicinity XT4212 and re-deployed to the area of contact arriving at approximately 1500. At 1735, 4/23 Infantry (Mech) made contact with an estimated VC battalion resulting in 22 VC KIA (BC), 7 US KIA and 30 US WIA. The 4/23 Infantry (Mech) operating in a coordinated attack with the 49th ARVN Regiment continued the contact on 29 April. At XT545117 an enemy force was fixed in a bunker complex at 1230. Fire was delivered with all organic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery and Air Force air strikes resulting in 33 VC KIA (BC), 15 AK-47 rifles, 5 carbines, and 3 RPG rocket launchers.

(p8)

The cumulative results of operation TOAN THANG as of 30 April 1968 are as follows:

US losses: 87 KIA, 534 WIA (403 evacuated), 10 APC's, 1 tank, 2 helicopters, 1 trailer and 1 dozer destroyed, 3 trucks, 1 trailer, 5 helicopters, 4 tanks and 4 APC's damaged

Enemy losses: 759 KIA, 16 PW's, 161 detainees, 192 individual weapons, 34 crew-served weapons, 117 pounds of documents, 17.6 tons of rice, 1368 grenades, 30879 small arms rounds, 387 rocket, mortar or artillery rounds, and 1200 mortar fuses captured; 288 mortar, rocket or artillery rounds, 22 mines, 4305 small arms rounds, 584 grenades, 11 sampans, 28.8 tons of rice, 3 crew-served weapons, 6 individual weapons, 55 bomb cluster units, 1.6 tons of salt, 1 truck and 4 bombs destroyed.

b. Artillery Support: See separate ORAL prepared and submitted by 25th Infantry Division Artillery per paragraph 3c., USARV Regulation 525-15.

- c. Intelligence: See TAB L
- d. Logistics: See TAB J
- e. Administration See TAB K
- f. Provost Marshall Activities. See TAB Q
- g. Revolutionary Development Support See TAB M
- h. Civic Action. See TAB M
- i. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) See TAB M
- j. Signal Activities See TAB O
- k. Engineer Activities. See TAB N

I. Army Aviation See TAB P

m. Training

(1) During the period 1 February - 30 April 1968, formal training activities were curtailed by the TET Offensive and its aftermath. Only mission essential training was conducted. The following listed number of personnel attended division schools:

Replacement Training	4131	Small Arms Inspection	24
Mines and Booby Traps	4275	Generator Maintenance	40
Demolitions and Explosives	4386	Mess Management	17
Combat Leaders Course	378	Tunnel Destruction	32

(2) Curtailed instruction was also experienced at non-divisional schools. The following numbers of division personnel attended non-divisional schools:

<u>COURSE TITLE</u>	<u>INSTRUCTOR</u>	<u>NUMBER ATTENDED</u>
Airframe Maintenance, UH-1B, C	765 th Trans Bn	6
Airframe Maintenance, UH-1B	765 th Trans Bn	8
Airframe Maintenance, OH-6A	765 th Trans Bn	9
Turbine Engine Maint. T-53-L-13	765 th Trans Bn	1
Engine Maintenance, T-63	765 th Trans Bn	8
Avionics Communications Supply	765 th Trans Bn	5
LOH (OH-6A) AC Pilto Transition	765 th Trans Bn	4
AN/TSO-43 TIF Maintenance	1 st MI Bn (ARS)	1
Jungle Environmental Survival Crs	Fleet Elect Trng - Unit Pacific	5
JUSPAO Orientation Course	MACV	3 (P9)

n. Air Support: The following air support was received by the 25th Infantry Division during February, March and April 1968.

(1) Tac Air: 1283 missions consisting of 2413 sorties were flown in support of the division during this period. 3089 tons of bombs were expended with the following results: 614 VC KIA (BC) 453 VC KIA (Poss), 205 secondary explosions, and 81 secondary fires. In addition, 2579 bunkers, 771 military structures, 35 sampans, 6 bridges, 3 VC trucks, and 3940 meters of trench-line were destroyed.

(2) 30 B-52 strikes consisting of 180 sorties were flown during this period. 4860 tons of ordnance were expended resulting in 96 VC KIA (BC) and 39 secondary explosions.

(p10)

II. LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

A. Personnel

1. Casualty Reporting.

(a) OBSERVATION: Difficulties have been encountered in preparing timely and accurate casualty reports at battalion level.

(b) DISCUSSION: Battalion S-1's have encountered difficulties in collecting data necessary to submit timely and accurate casualty reports to higher headquarters. The data should be made available to the battalion S-1 by subordinate units as soon as possible after the action in which

casualties were sustained. In addition to name, rank, serial number and unit of the casualty, information should include which unit individual was with if he was separated from his parent unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders must take a personal interest in ascertaining that lower unit leaders (platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, team leaders) are aware of their responsibilities in respect to initiating a timely and accurate casualty report through channels by the quickest means of transmission.

2. Medically Evacuated Personnel

(a) OBSERVATION: Considerable delay has been experienced in the evacuation of health and dental records of medically evacuated personnel.

(b) DISCUSSION: Companies have been slow in processing the health and dental records of medically evacuated personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Battalion and Company Commanders must make it a matter of personal interest to insure that the medical and dental records of medically evacuated personnel are forwarded through channels in an expeditious manner.

3. Movement of Units

(a) OBSERVATION: The re-deployment of units frequently on short notice from one base area to another results in unnecessary inconveniences for the unit at its new base.

(b) DISCUSSION: Except where the tactical situation makes it impossible, unit commanders should notify base commanders at least 24 hours in advance of their forthcoming arrival at a new base. Minimum information in this communication should be size of the unit, mess facilities required, and any special consideration (i.e. Aviation units should be billeted near an air strip.)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That unit commanders notify commanders of new base area of their arrival and requirements at least 24 hours in advance.

4. Unit Strength Figures:

(a) OBSERVATION: Difficulty in maintaining accurate unit strength figures.

(b) EVALUATION: Orders continue to create problems in maintaining accurate strength figures, especially as reflected at higher headquarters. The average time period for receiving orders requested by a unit is two and one half weeks for GI, and up to a month for officers.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Command emphasis at all levels should be given to insure the prompt publishing and distribution of orders.

(p11)

B. Operations:

1. Ambushes on Waterways:

(a) OBSERVATION: Techniques of ambushes on waterway lines of communications.

(b) EVALUATION: Companies were inserted / extracted both by overland and by use of 27' engineer boats. The insertion was conducted approximately 1000 meters from the ambush site. The

area adjacent to the ambush site was searched and secured. The remainder of the day was spent in hiding. The ambush was established at dark, consisting of a killer force armed with M-14 rifles loaded with tracer rounds, a starlight scope, claymores, LAWS and M-79'S, a lookout force, and a rear security force. The ambush patrol leader armed with a M-14 and a starlight scope was the initiator of the ambush, with the remainder of the "killer force" following suit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Careful prior planning must be made before the mission is undertaken. In addition during the period spent in hiding, final planning is made in the organization of the ambush. Rest is essential since the ambush must maintain a 100% alert throughout the night. An average of 6+ kills per ambush for 7 ambushes while suffering only 2 WIA's demonstrates the effectiveness of this technique.

2. Three man reconnaissance rafts:

(a) OBSERVATION: Use of 3 man reconnaissance rafts by small units.

(b) EVALUATION: Some units made extensive use of 3 man reconnaissance rafts in day to day operations and in inserting and extracting ambush patrols ranging in size from a platoon to a company. Each unit carried a 3 man reconnaissance raft and lengths of nylon rope. The rope was tied to the raft fore and aft, and fairly rapid river crossings were accomplished.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: By using 3 man reconnaissance rafts with lengths of rope, the units became versatile, enabling them to cross canals, streams, and rivers to reach their ambush sites which under other conditions would have been inaccessible. By using these rafts, ambushes were established at sites such as islands in the middle of canals and on opposite banks of streams. We operated in areas to which access was gained under the cover of darkness with the use of rafts. Thereby on many occasions, complete surprise over the enemy was gained, and his lines of communication and re-supply along water routes was disrupted. These rafts are very light, and easily transportable by the individual soldier.

3. Use of 8" Howitzer as a bunker buster.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of 8" Howitzer as a bunker buster.

(b) EVALUATION: During the battle of AP CHO, a battalion used LAW's and 90mm recoilless rifles in an attempt to eliminate enemy resistance from hardened bunkers. These weapons had little or no effect on the bunkers nor the personnel manning them. The battalion asked for and received an 8" self propelled Howitzer to be employed as a direct fire "bunker buster" from a range of approximately 750 meters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The direct fire method using the self propelled Howitzer as a "sniper rifle" was extremely effective. The elimination of the use of several smaller weapons proved quite satisfactory as the 8" gun was capable of eliminating each individual bunker with one round.

4. Use of 27" Whaler Boat::

(a) OBSERVATION: The 27' Whaler Boat. (p12)

(b) EVALUATION: The 27' Whaler was used extensively by the 3-22 Infantry during the period covered by this operational report. This small craft increases the mobility of the infantryman, and turns a natural obstacle into a valuable asset for the ground troops. In many areas of RVN,

where natural and man-made waterways are abundant, the 27' Whaler is a primary means of troop and re-supply transport.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The speed with which troops can be deployed into an area gives the infantryman the elements of surprise and flexibility. The use of the 27' Whaler boats is limited by their vulnerability to enemy fire. Those craft have no armor protection which makes security of waterways very important. Safety while using these craft must receive a great deal of command emphasis. An unfortunate accident resulted in six drowning casualties when one boat capsized during a recent operation. All personnel should be given a safety briefing to include actions to be taken if the craft comes under fire, and proper wearing of web gear and equipment so that it can be shed quickly in the event it is necessary to abandon the craft.

5. Use of the OH-23G

(a) OBSERVATION: Down time of OH-23G

(b) EVALUATION: Keeping the organic OH-23's flying after several days of constant use. It became increasingly difficult to meet Bn C&C commitments, as the helicopters would be in maintenance, both organic and direct support, after flying 8 - 10 hours daily.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Other means must be utilized for administrative transportation to free the observation helicopter for Bn C&C. Unless in contact, the Bn must be limited to a limited amount of flying time each day.

6. Use of TAC AIR:

(a) OBSERVATION: Down time of OH-23G

(b) EVALUATION: Tactical air support was used frequently, especially in instances of enemy contact, and was an invaluable source of additional fire power.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The minimum coordination required to obtain air support and results obtained from those air strikes assisted in reducing enemy resistance. Also the ability of Napalm to burn off jungle canopy and bamboo hedge rows helped expose enemy bunkers and fortified positions.

7. Use of Night Locations:

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy foxholes

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that frequently used larger areas present problems in that the VC have prepared positions on their outer limits which enable them to slip in at night and engage friendly forces, then withdraw after return fires have subsided.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Sweep out around all positions to locate any positions that can be used by the VC.

8. Anti-mine Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy use of shrapnel and scrap metal around the vicinity of buried wooden mines.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the VC will use shrapnel and expended shell casings from 1-5 meters in all directions of an anti-tank mine composed of wood. This will cause the sweep team to pick up the metal and go on, overlooking the wooden mine.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When casings or shrapnel in excess amounts (p13)`
(missing sentence)

9. Information Gained From Children:

(a) OBSERVATION: Observation by Vietnamese children along a MSR:

(b) EVALUATION: The children along the MSR when rewarded, will provide constant observation between spaced outposts as well as show friendly personnel where the VC have placed mines, booby traps, stored ammunition and dud rounds. They also are an invaluable source of intelligence on the enemy's night activities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Reward the children for any information they can give.

10. Discovery of Anti-tank Mines:

(a) OBSERVATION: More anti-tank mines have been found by probing than with electric sweepers.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found by employing double the number of probers with one engineer team, more anti-tank mines were uncovered.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Coordinate with your engineer support and use more probing crews along stretches of road like the MSR.

11. Use of Scout Dogs:

(a) OBSERVATION: Use of scout dogs along the flanks of engineer sweep teams.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the use of a scout dog team on each flank of an engineer sweep team discourages the enemy from employing command detonated mines along a road or trail.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Scout dogs should be employed on the flanks to discourage command detonated mines on engineer sweep teams.

12. Enemy Base Camp Indicators:

(a) OBSERVATION: Stumps of trees (base camp indicators).

(b) EVALUATION: When mounted or dismounted and moving through jungle, the appearance of one stump and no others can possibly mean that an enemy base camp is near. This area should be regarded instantly as a danger area. By examination of the stump it can be estimated approximately how much time the enemy could have been making preparations on such a camp.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Examine all signs of VC activity before entering an area.

13. Ambush Patrols"

(a) OBSERVATION: Often intelligence reports indicate the routine operation of small bands of VC in a certain area, but when ambush patrols are put in the area VC are not present.

(b) EVALUATION: The VC have a very effective intelligence net in VC controlled areas which makes insertion of a platoon sized force almost impossible without compromise. When it is known that the VC operating in the area are small in number, establishment of a squad sized AP is much more likely to be accomplished without compromise and more likely to meet with success.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased consideration be given to the use of squad sized ambushes in lieu of larger size ambush patrols.

14. Bridge Erection Boat used as a Gunboat:

(a) OBSERVATION: 27" Bridge Erection Boats were used to patrol the Saigon River, canals and streams of the Saigon River. The boats carried either an M-60 or 50 caliber machine gun sand-bagged to the bow.

(p14)

(b) EVALUATION: A 27' Bridge Erection Boat when equipped with a 50 caliber machine gun as the firepower, space and mobility to effectively patrol streams and canals.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That 27' Bridge Erection Boats armed with 50 caliber machine guns be used in patrolling streams and canals

15. Seismic Tunnel Detector:

(a) OBSERVATION: Evaluation of the Seismic Echoing System was conducted in two parts: 26 March - 4 April training and controlled tests were conducted at Cu Chi Base Camp. 5 April - 10 April, 68 operational tests were conducted in the BOI LOI WOODS and at Dau Tieng Base Camp. The equipment broke down and was returned direct to ACTIV on 10 April 68.

(b) EVALUATION: The Oscilloscope interpretation required too great a skill level for this equipment to be issued to combat engineer units. The equipment package is too fragile. The design of the sending and receiving units makes them difficult to drive into the ground during the Vietnam dry season. This results in:

- (1) Poor coupling with resultant poor signal generations, and
- (2) Excessive set up time for each reading..

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Seismic Echoing System in its present configuration is not acceptable for use in the 25th Infantry Division tactical situation.

16. Boston Whalers used for troop transport and patrolling:

(a) OBSERVATION: Boston Whalers were used to ferry troops to and from ambush sites, aid in checking of river borne craft, and assist in night river patrolling. They also provided a water-borne blocking force. Troops were loaded on the boats and put on station in areas where contact was expected. As the ground forces made their contact sweeps, the troops in the boats were available to reinforce or cut off escape via the river. One tactic utilized was the "silent drift" where the boats would just float with the current. This method enabled the boats to reach their locations without the give away noise of the engine.

(b) EVALUATION: Boston Whalers are ideal for operations on small canals and rivers. Ambush patrols can be inserted or extracted quickly and silently. These boats can also be utilized to ambush VC forces from the river. The Boston Whaler has a shallow draft, speed, and

maneuverability which make it an excellent craft for this type mission. One limitation is that only 8 personnel can be carried by one boat.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Boston Whalers be used for river borne ambush operations.

17. Burning of Large Rome-Plowed Areas:

(a) OBSERVATION: 4 UH-1D's were each loaded with 12 cases of incendiary grenades. 4 engineers were in each ship to arm and drop grenades. The four airships fly parallel courses approximately 100 meters apart, approximately 50 feet above the ground at 100 - 110 knots. One grenade was dropped every 2 seconds resulting in approximately 100 meters spacing. (An area 8 sq Km was covered with each sortie). A LFT was used as security.

(b) EVALUATION: Numerous small fires were started by this method. A large area can be covered with a small on-target-time. The small fires did not spread, resulting in many small burned patches.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The effectiveness of this area burning technique is unsatisfactory.

18. Expendable Mine Roller: (p15)

(a) OBSERVATION: Expendable Mine Roller is mounted on a M48A3 tank. Mounting and assembly took six hours with five engineer personnel working. Upon striking mine, device flew apart as designed with no damage to tank. A trained crew can put the roller back into operation in 20 - 25 minutes...

(b) EVALUATION: The roller is easily repairable after damage by a mine. The backup of a wrecker and a truck to carry repair parts consisting of an assembly is required. The roller is reliable in detonating load mines of the pressure type. When turning, the tank track passes over portions of road not covered by roller. The sharper the turn, the more area not covered by the roller.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Attention be given to re-designing roller to be more effective on turning movements.

19. Three man Recon. Boat:

(a) OBSERVATION: 3-man recon boats can effectively be used to cross small streams or canals, reconnoiter streams, canals, and bridge sites. Due to troop carrying limitations, recon boats are not recommended for large troop crossing.

(b) EVALUATION: Extreme care must be taken in beaching to avoid puncturing the side or floor of boat. During over land movement, care must be taken so the boat does not drag or rub on any moving surface. This will also result in puncturing side and floor of boat.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: 3-man recon boat is an effective vehicle if care is taken to avoid contact with obstacles which will puncture the surface/

20. Airlifting of Float Bridging by CH-54

(a) OBSERVATION: Two floats with 10 pieces of balk connecting the floats can be airlifted by CH-54. Actual weight is 15,010 pounds. Due to the surface area of the floats, the water collected

in the floats, and the down pressure exerted by the rotor, the CH-54 lifted between 18,000 - 20,000 pounds..

(b) EVALUATION & RECOMMENDATION: Float Bridges can be assembled and disassembled in half the time by airlifting in 2 floats by CH-54 instead of one float by CH-47. This weight over-loads the CH-54, so this technique should only be used in critical situations.

21. Dispersion of Elements:

(a) OBSERVATION: Many American soldiers have the "herd" tendency. From the small combat patrol to the troop or squadron, they feel that the closer they are together, the safer they are.

(b) EVALUATION: When a unit is not dispersed, it makes it possible for a smaller VC unit to attack the closed unit with less danger to the VC. The VC can very quickly inflict heavy casualties when a unit is not dispersed properly. There cannot be enough emphasis placed on dispersion of troops or vehicles, and moving in proper formations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The element of dispersion should receive greater attention in training, planning of tactical operations, and execution thereof.

22. Selection of Night Blocking Positions:

(a) OBSERVATION: A night blocking position differs from a night defensive position in that the blocking position is selected as an offensive location.

(b) EVALUATION: A night blocking position should be selected with intent of finding the enemy or having him walk up to the position unknowingly. This can be accomplished by using a hedgerow or hedgerow complex for the location. The unit, one inside the hedgerow, can arrange its vehicles or rifleman positions at the outer edge of the hedgerow. This will provide good fields of fire, security against

(p16)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The proper selection and arrangement of blocking positions should be stressed in training activities.

23. Combat Casualties:

(a) OBSERVATION: The instinct of the American soldier in combat when he sees another soldier wounded is to immediately stop whatever he is doing and help the injured man.

(b) EVALUATION: When he stops fighting to help the injured man, the loss of his fire power will probably cause more casualties. It should be emphasized that the line troops continue their mission and leave the wounded to the medics, rear elements, or take care of them after the contact is broken.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Training agencies should emphasize the importance of the individual continuing his mission and leaving the care of wounded to the medics.

24. Gun-shields on Personnel Carriers:

(a) OBSERVATION: The gun-shields manufactured locally are below the standards of the ones that come pre-constructed on new Personnel Carriers.

(b) EVALUATION: If factory made gun-shields are mounted around the 50 Cal and two M-60's there is much more fire power and security for the crew. The ACAV kits should be issued for the Cavalry Squadron.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Only factory made gun-shields should be used on personnel carriers.

25. Basic Load:

(a) OBSERVATION: It is extremely rare in Vietnam when an individual manning an M-16, M-79, M-60 or 50 Caliber will carry the basic load prescribed. Normally they carry three or four times the basic load.

(b) EVALUATION: The situation and ammo usage should be analysed and new basic load standards set.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a larger basic load of ammo be prescribed.

26. Destruction of Minor Fortifications:

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noticed that many times there is a need for an explosive slightly more powerful than the standard fragmentation grenades to destroy minor fortifications.

(b) EVALUATION: This can be accomplished by wrapping the fragmentation grenade with one strip of Flex-X. This will give the extra power needed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the effectiveness of this field expedient be made known by publications.

C. Training

1. Weapons Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel utilizing all weapons available.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that all members of a platoon are not familiar with some of the basic mechanized infantry weapons. A training period should be established within the platoons to familiarize all personnel with these weapons. (.50 Cal, 90mm recoilless rifle, M-60, and LAW) in case usage becomes necessary.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Provide the necessary training time within platoons to familiarize individuals with all basic weapons available. (p17)

2. Small Unit Training:

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period one battalion conducted one week of refresher training. Training included squad and platoon tactics, M16 test firing, maintenance periods and flame thrower instruction.

(b) EVALUATION: The training held was beneficial in improving operating procedures within the battalion. However, the time allowed was not sufficient to reach a high degree of individual and small unit proficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A period of three weeks would allow increased opportunity for instruction in such vital subjects as squad and platoon tactics, fire distribution techniques and small unit live fire battle drill exercises.

D Intelligence

1. Target File

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a need at Division level for an OB Section to produce lucrative targets based upon documents, IW's and other sources. An incident file is not suited for this function. A solution is a Target File. This file consists of 3"x5" cards. Each card covers a grid square (4 digit coordinates), and the cards are filed in numerical order by the first two digits, and then by the last two. When a IW, document, or other source indicates an enemy target in a grid, the appropriate card is pulled, and the exact coordinates, nature of target and reference is entered.

(b) EVALUATION: This card system is highly flexible, allowing cards to be withdrawn or to be altered without damaging the file as occurs with notebooks or other bound volumes. It allows OD personnel to build a detailed list of targets that can be readily passed to visiting S-2's, and can be used to plot air-strikes and artillery concentrations. The system can be modified and improved without destroying the file, as often happens with bound volumes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That division OD Sections organize a target file as discussed.

2. Visual Reconnaissance by Air

(a) OBSERVATION: The aerial observer may be used in two ways. First, in a general reconnaissance of the area to discover new targets and movement. Secondly, to confirm intelligence reports of enemy locations. Any significant target are given to FSE for H&I fire.

(b) EVALUATION: The quickest way to confirm targets is through the targeting section. They have been limited and have not been able to confirm intelligence reports due to lack of air assets. If the targeting section can be allocated one of two aircraft on daily basis, the intelligence network can be made to function more effectively.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the targeting section be allocated one or two aircraft on a daily basis.

3. Evacuation of Captured Enemy Material.

(a) OBSERVATION: Four VC flame-throwers were captured by a 25th Div unit and evacuated to LW Section, Cu Chi. The tanks on the flame-throwers all contained a full load of fuel, and in the later handling of this material, the unit was accidentally ignited, resulting in wounds to US personnel. In an earlier case, a captured AK-47 was turned in with a misfired round in the chamber. Upon being turned into the S-2 section, 1st Bde, one US WIA resulted from the normal handling of this weapon.

(b) EVALUATION: If there is any doubt or question pertaining to the safety of captured material, it should be checked or destroyed prior to evacuation. (p18)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That potentially dangerous material be rendered safe before turned in or destroyed in place.

4. Documents Captured with a Detainee.

(a) OBSERVATION: In April 1968, a detainee was brought in to be interrogated. The detainee was interrogated and classified Civil Defendant due to the lack of proper identification. Source stated that he had full identification when captured, but this could not be verified. After 3 days, the documents belonging to this individual were produced by the capturing unit. This detainee should have been classified "Innocent Civilian", but had already been turned over to ARVN authorities.

(b) EVALUATION: All documents belonging to detainees should remain on the person being detained. Thus, when undergoing interrogation at the IWCP, accurate and proper classification can be given. This lesson applies to documents found on captured VC IW's.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Special care should be taken to insure documents remain with the detainee, as an uncooperative VC PW can be more successfully interrogated when confronted with authentic and accurate information obtained from incriminating documents.

5. SLAR and HAZE Readouts.

(a) OBSERVATION: SLAR, the side looking airborne radar, is used to detect the movement of sampans, vehicles and other moving military targets. Red Haze, an infra-red device detects heat emissions such as campfires, charcoal ovens, running motors and other heat emitters.

(b) EVALUATION: Readouts of SLAR & RED HAZE takes considerable time, most readouts being 5 to 6 hours old. When immediate in-flight readouts are received from aircraft, the time is cut from 15 to 20 minutes. This information, when passed / monitored by FSE or the Artillery FDC, can be immediately fired as H&I fires with a much higher possibility of inflicting damage on the enemy than ordinary H&I fires. Also, when these devices are used in conjunction, improved intelligence is available to the using unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: FSE and Artillery FDC should monitor in-flight readout of SLAR and RED HAZE, and be prepared to react to this information with the H&I program.

6. Expeditious Readout of Aerial Photography.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the time factor in ordering aerial photography through normal channels, steps were taken to rely on the 73rd SAC (Mohawks) in obtaining immediate coverage of "suspected" areas. Their cooperation and professional results were such that a mission was requested, flown and the interpreted information requested by the G-2 was available within 26 hours.

(b) EVALUATION: Greater utilization of the 73rd's resources enhances the efficiency of the imagery interpretation section and increases the intelligence community of the 25th Division through accurate, complete and timely photographic intelligence, when immediate coverage is required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Greater use of 73rd SAC (Mohawks) for aerial photography should be made by all units.

7. Debriefing of IPW Detainees for CI Information.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel detained by the IPW can contribute to CI effort in obtaining valuable intelligence information in their areas of residence, and employment concerning guerrilla units and infrastructure.

(b) EVALUATION and RECOMMENDATION: Local guerrillas and civil defendants should be interrogated and thoroughly debriefed concerning local guerrilla activities and infrastructure in their area of knowledge. This debriefing period will also present the CI with possible spotting and recruitment of intelligence sources for future use. (p19)

8. Enemy Capabilities:

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit for the first time encountered hamlets and villages in which the hedge rows (mainly bamboo) were set in a checkerboard fashion. The enemy selected positions in the corners of each square.

(b) EVALUATION: Bunkers were placed under the hedge row with apertures almost at ground level. Each bunker could support all adjacent bunkers. It was also noted that the hedge rows were tinned out on the outside of the village for better surveillance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Make more use of hedge rows for cover and movement.

9. Sources of Information:

(a) OBSERVATION and EVALUATION: It has been noted that the enemy dead have not been thoroughly searched for documents, marks of identification, nor of the KIA's appearance, condition of clothing and equipment.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should insure appropriate training and supervision of small units and individuals in methods of searching enemy I/Ws and KIAs, stressing the importance of reporting the enemy's appearance.

10. Intelligence Readout on POW's.

(a) OBSERVATION and EVALUATION: The 2/12th Inf. captured several POW's during the period. In most cases feedback information emanating from higher headquarters resulting from interrogation of these prisoners were not funneled back to the capturing unit.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: Unit personnel, especially those directly involved in the capture, express high interest in the results of these interrogations. Prompt receipt of interrogation reports in addition to their intelligence value enhance the morale of members of the capturing unit.

11. Utilization of Hoi Chans.

(a) OBSERVATION: Often Hoi Chan personnel will be flown in an aircraft to attempt to point out enemy base areas and troop concentrations with negative results, because the Hoi Chan is unable to identify the area of interest from the air.

(b) EVALUATION: Many Hoi Chans are terrified by the prospect of air travel. Because of this fear, the Hoi Chans are distracted from their mission, and avoid looking at the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: If the Hoi Chan is given an initial familiarization flight, and given an opportunity to become acclimated to the aircraft, results are much better.

12. Utilization of Hoi Chans

(a) OBSERVATION: Many Hoi Chans when evacuated to intelligence personnel have valuable information concerning enemy locations, but when their directions are followed, the enemy is not found.

(b) EVALUATION: Many Vietnamese are very poor at estimating distances if the person is taken outside and asked to estimate various distances. If he is given the opportunity to draw the location on a sand table, and then taken outside to show what distances correspond to distances on the sand table, a much higher incidence of successful exploitation of intelligence will result.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Hoi Chans be provided guidance as referenced above.
(p20)

13. Utilization of Hoi Chans:

(a) OBSERVATION: Many times a Hoi Chan will indicate an area of enemy activity on a map, but it will not be found by US Personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Often the Hoi Chan has only gone to and returned from the area by one route. If the air or ground party start out with the Hoi Chan from his point of origin, they are much more likely to find the area than if they attempt to approach it from a direction with which the Hoi Chan is unfamiliar.

(c) Recommendation: That in using Hoi Chans to identify locations, every attempt be made to retrace individual's actual route from point of initiation.

E. Logistics:

1. M109 Howitzer

(a) OBSERVATION: Equipment with extensive modification or involving numerous Federal Stock Number Changes should be preceded by revised parts manuals and a list of modifications that were performed. The lack of repair parts for new equipment increased maintenance problems.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem area encountered with the M109 Howitzers has been partially corrected by issue of fourth and fifth year production models. The new equipment is functioning properly, but weapons were delivered without revised TM's or adequate repair parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None

2. Equipment Maintenance.

(a) OBSERVATION: The changing of oil, oil filters, and the cleaning of air intake and oil cooler systems under the dusty dry season environment cannot be over stressed.

(b) EVALUATION: Extensive operations in dusty conditions continues to be a major cause of engine failure. Oil samples were taken from a random selection of engines, both operational and non-operational. The sediment content of all engines in the non-operational category was excessive.

The carbon residue was also high in these engines. A letter was published during the period instructing the units to increase the frequency of maintenance of filters, and the change of lubricants.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All units must stress the changing of oil and oil filters, and the cleaning of air intake and oil cooler systems during the dry season.

3. Fork Slide Bearing of the Anthony Model MLT6 6,000 Pound Forklift.

(a) OBSERVATION: Conditions where dirt, dust and sand are a problem necessitates the operation of the fork slide bearing in a dry state.

(b) EVALUATION and RECOMMENDATION: The fork slide bearing is made of nylon and is self lubricating. Normal operating conditions call for GAA lube. However, for conditions where dirt and sand are a problem, bearings should be thoroughly cleaned and operated dry.

4. Disconnecter Safety of the 45 Caliber Pistol.

(a) OBSERVATION: An abnormally high number of requests for replacement of the disconnecter safety of the 45 caliber pistol -----resulted from CMI's. This is an indication that unit armorers are not aware of proper inspection techniques as pertains to the pistol.

(p21)

(b) EVALUATION and RECOMMENDATION: Small arms inspection courses are conducted monthly. Proper inspection procedures will be stressed in future classes on the pistol.

5. Vehicle Maintenance:

(a) OBSERVATION: New Vehicles (M11341).

(b) EVALUATION: A driver with a new vehicle is more likely to be lax in his in his maintenance duties. This is due to the fact that no explanation has been given him by his platoon leader, platoon sergeant, or maintenance sergeant of why he must watch for new engine defects, loose bolts, or track expansion. These are just a few of the problem areas with new vehicles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Insure proper maintenance measures are taken by all drivers, and that the drivers are aware of all responsibilities.

6. Storage:

(a) OBSERVATION: AN-PRT and TA-1 Storage

(b) EVALUATION: These small radios and telephones are delicate, and as a result of this, damage occurs very easily from rough handling. It should be SOP that these sets, when not in use, should be stored in a safe place where men will not, nor cannot walk on them causing extensive damage. Also, the trading of radios is not advised, because each platoon is on a different frequency, and as a result, personnel regard the radio as inoperable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Store fragile equipment in a safe place when it is not in use to decrease breakage.

7. Resupply

(a) OBSERVATION: Adjustment of carrying loads for individuals.

(b) EVALUATION: One of the battalions operated in areas which were a major distance from its main supply source. This condition necessitated a principle reliance on air means for daily re-supply. Weather conditions during this period were ideal for this method of resupply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During the coming rains (Monsoon) the efficiency of this technique of resupply will be reduced and units may be required to subsist for longer periods without resupply. With adjustments in individual loads, this problem can be reduced to some extent

E. Organization None

F. Other

1. Use of "Helping Hand"

(a) OBSERVATION: Rice and other food commodities captured from the enemy can be profitably used within the "Helping Hand Project."

(b) EVALUATION: Captured rice and other food commodities stored at "Helping Hand" were an important source of sustenance, and measurably assisted in feeding refugees during the VC TET Offensive. Additionally, the salvage lumber stockpiled at "Helping Hand" has been used extensively by the RF/PF, ARVN and civilians as a source of building material.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Captured rice and foodstuffs should be evacuated for future use in civic actions, and salvage lumber should be ----- (p22)

2. Treatment of Plague:

(a) OBSERVATION: The reaction to the recent Plague outbreak was unsatisfactory.

(b) EVALUATION: A high incidence of Plague was evidenced in TAY NINH Province during the reported period. GVN/CORDS did not have sufficient vaccine on hand to conduct an immediate inoculation program. Stockpiles of insecticide powder were not available for immediate use. Reaction to the outbreak by preventive health teams should have occurred sooner.

(c) OBSERVATION: Prior planning and anticipation of the reoccurrence of Plague should be effected. Sufficient vaccines and insecticide powder should be stockpiled for immediate use.

III. (C) HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION:
TACTICAL COVER AND CONCEALMENT:

Several examples are available to illustrate tactical cover and concealment techniques used within this division during the reporting period.

The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry recently placed into position a company ambush patrol in such a way as to deliberately compromise its position and draw enemy attention to its location. Once inserted, the ambush patrol was directed to simulate an ambush by fire, and thereby draw the attention of enemy troops in the vicinity. When this action was commenced and underway, a second company size ambush patrol was placed into a position that was considered more lucrative. The insertion of this ambush patrol went entirely undetected due to the enemy's preoccupation with the fire being delivered by the decoy unit. When the second ambush patrol was in position, the decoy

ambush patrol was successfully extracted. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry reports using those tactics on three separate occasions during the reporting period, each time in a successful manner.

The use of smoke delivered by helicopters has been successfully used within this division to cover the extraction of units pinned down by enemy fire in open positions. In such instances, smoke ships are called in to lay down a screen between enemy firing positions and the friendly unit. With the observation obscured on the enemy's field of fire, successful withdrawal of units, their casualties and equipment, has been accomplished. Smoke has also been used on a limited basis within the division to cover the advance on divisional units on enemy objectives.

(p23)

The use of cover afforded by darkness has come in for increased emphasis and use within the division. The objective of taking the night away from the enemy has been successfully accomplished. Lt. Col. Roy K. Flint, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, and Lt Col. Glenn K. Otis, Commanding Officer, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry have been extremely successful in training their units for night ambushing operations, and have been executing these ambushes with regularity. The tactics generally involve the movement of ambush patrols under cover of darkness to predetermine ambush locations, execution of an ambush and movement of a unit under cover of darkness to a predetermined alternate ambush site. It has been proven that with the proper training to instill confidence in his ability as a night fighter, the 25th Infantry Division soldier is equal to or superior to the enemy as a night fighter. Lt Col Otis and Lt Col Flint have prepared papers and presentations of their units night fighting activities. Copies of these papers are now in the process of being forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Military History for record purposes. In addition the 1st ----- considerably for night ambushing operations along avenues of approach from the west into the Saigon area. A "Small Unit After Action Interview Report" (audio tape) on one such ambush conducted by the battalion's Reconnaissance Platoon, has been recently forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Military History. The report provides a complete description of the platoon's operation under the cover of darkness, specifying deceptive actions taken to conceal the location of the ambush site.

(p24)

FOR THE COMMANDER: B.F. HOOD
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

Reviewed: 12 May 68 1st Lt. O.B. FORY (p25)
12 May 68 Captain C.S. NAKATSUKASA (p26)
12 May 68 Captain C.L. SHORT (p27)

TASK ORGANIZATION (p28)

Task organization for the 25th Infantry Division for the period 1 February to 30 April 1968 is listed below. This task organization reflects the general organization of the division for the reporting period, and does not take into account the frequent shifting of maneuver and task forces to meet a given tactical situation. Such adjustments in task organization are reflected in the Combat After Action Reports included as TABS B,C,D and E to this report.

25th Infantry Division Troops

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 25th Infantry Division

25th Administration Company

25th Aviation Battalion

3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry

3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry

65th Engineer Battalion

125th Signal Battalion

25th Military History Detachment

9th Chemical Detachment

15th PI Detachment

20th PI Detachment

25th MI Detachment

32nd Weather Detachment, 5th Squadron

34th Aviation Detachment

390th Quartermaster Detachment

2nd Civil Affairs Company

6th Battalion, 77th Artillery

Battery B, 5th Battalion, 2nd Artillery

Company F, I 50th Infantry

38th Scout Dog Platoon

44th Scout Dog Platoon

1st Infantry Brigade Troops

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade

1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech)

2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry

4th Battalion, 9th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 34th Armor

2nd Infantry Brigade Troops

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Brigade

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mech)

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry

2nd Battalion 27th Infantry

3rd Infantry Brigade Troops

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Brigade

2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mech)

3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry

2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry

Division Artillery Troops

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, DIVARTY

1st Battalion, 8th Artillery

7th Battalion, 11th Artillery

3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

(p28)

Division Support Command Troops

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, DISCON

25th Medical Battalion

25th Supply and Transportation Battalion

725th Maintenance Battalion

199th Light Infantry Brigade (OPCON to 25th Infantry Division 32 March to 9 April)

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 199th Infantry Brigade

3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry

4th Battalion, 12th Infantry

(p29)